The Grendel Report: Hizb Allah Resurrected: The Party of God's Return to Tradecraft

Hizb Allah Resurrected: The Party of God's Return to Tradecraft

By Matthew Levitt

CTC Sentinel April 2013 . Vol 6 . Issue 4

During the past few years, Lebanese Hizb Allah's global operations increased

markedly, but until recently its efforts yielded few successes. In July

2012, however, Hizb Allah operatives bombed a busload of Israeli tourists in

Burgas, Bulgaria, killing five Israelis and a Bulgarian bus driver.1 Yet

what may prove no less significant than this operational success was another

plot foiled in Cyprus just two weeks earlier. The Cyprus plot provided the

clearest window yet on the rejuvenation of Hizb Allah's tradecraft and the

capabilities of the group's international terrorist wing, the Islamic Jihad

Organization (IJO).

1 "Israelis Killed in Bulgaria Bus Terror Attack, Minister Says," CNN, July

18, 2012; John Kerry, "Bulgarian Announcement on Hizballah's Role in Burgas

Attack," U.S. Department of State, February 5, 2013.

This article traces Hizb Allah's recent spike in operational activity since

2008, highlighting the group's efforts to rejuvenate the capabilities of its

IJO. Many of these details derive from the author's extensive conversations

with Israeli security officials in Tel Aviv, which were then vetted and

confirmed in conversations with American and European security, intelligence

and military officials.

The article also provides a detailed case study of Hossam Yaacoub-the

convicted Hizb Allah operative now serving time in a Cypriot prison for his

role in a plot targeting Israeli tourists-to show how Hizb Allah has

resurrected its terrorist capabilities. Drawn from the police depositions of

interviews with Yaacoub after his arrest, the case provides unique insights

into how Hizb Allah recruits and trains new operatives.

The article finds that while Hizb Allah's decision to stay out of the

crosshairs of the war on terrorism after 9/11 caused its global terrorist

capabilities to decline, the group has since rebuilt its IJO networks.

Operation Radwan Reveals Degraded Skills

In February 2008, a Damascus car bomb killed Hizb Allah's military chief,

Imad Mughniyyeh. At his funeral, Hizb Allah Secretary General Hassan

Nasrallah promised to retaliate with an "open war" against Israel. The

Israelis took the warning seriously, but Nasrallah may not have realized how

ill-prepared Hizb Allah was to follow through on the threat.

Israeli officials quickly took preventive action-from issuing specific

travel warnings to covert disruptive measures-against what they deemed the

most likely scenarios. Israeli officials did not have to wait long for Hizb

Allah to act. Yet when the IJO-then under the command of Mughniyyeh's

brother-in-law, Mustafa Badreddine, and Talal Hamiyeh-first set out to

avenge Mughniyyeh's death, Operation Radwan (named for Mughniyyeh, who was

also known as Hajj Radwan) experienced a series of setbacks.2

Even as it decided to operate in countries with comparatively lax security

rather than vigilant Western states, Hizb Allah's efforts to exact revenge

for Mughniyyeh's death failed repeatedly. In places such as Azerbaijan,

Egypt, and Turkey-and even with significant support from Qods Force3

agents-Hizb Allah suffered a series of failures, starting with the May 2008

fiasco in Baku, when a number of actions, including the planned bombing of

the U.S. and Israeli embassies, were disrupted.4 The event led to the quiet

release of Qods Force personnel, but the public prosecution of two Hizb

Allah operatives.5 Operations were soon

2 Personal interview, Israeli counterterrorism official, Tel Aviv, Israel,

March 17, 2008.

3 The Qods Force is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC) special

unit responsible for extraterritorial operations. Like the IRGC, the Qods

Force is under the direct control of the Iranian government.

4 Sebastian Rotella, "Azerbaijan Seen as New Front in Mideast Conflict," Los

Angeles Times, May 30, 2009; Lada Yevgrashina, "Lebanese Militants Jailed in

Baku Over Israel Plot," Reuters, October 5, 2009.

5 Sebastian Rotella, "Before Deadly Bulgaria Bombing, foiled in Egypt and

Turkey too, as well as attempts to kidnap Israelis in Europe and Africa.6

Nevertheless, however committed Hizb Allah was to carrying out such attacks,

the IJO was not up to the task. Hizb Allah's leaders had actively pared down

the IJO's global network of operatives following the 9/11 attacks in an

effort to stay out of the crosshairs of the war on terrorism. Moreover, the

"strategic partnership" it had shared with Iran for the past decade appears

to have focused on funding, training, and arming Hizb Allah's increasingly

effective standing militia, not on its cadre of international terrorists.

Therefore, Hizb Allah not only lacked the resources and capabilities to

execute a successful operation abroad, but it could also not rely on

Mughniyyeh to plan and direct operations.7

New Tasking from Tehran: Target Israeli Tourists

A foiled attack in Turkey in September 2009 was a watershed event for Hizb

Allah's operational planners and their Iranian sponsors.8 Despite the

increased logistical support Qods Force operatives provided for that plot,

Hizb Allah operatives still failed to execute the attack successfully.9

Israeli officials claimed that Hizb Allah and the Qods Force blamed each

other for the two years of failed operations, culminating in the botched

attack in Turkey and then another failed plot in Jordan in January 2010.10

Meanwhile, by late 2009 Israeli officials contended that Iran's interest in

Hizb Allah's operational prowess focused less on local issues like avenging

Mughniyyeh's death and Tracks of a Resurgent Iran-Hezbollah Threat," Foreign

Policy, July 30, 2012.

6 Personal interview, Israeli counterterrorism official, Tel Aviv, Israel,

September 13, 2012; Daniel Edelson, "Hezbollah Plans Attacks on Israeli

Targets in Turkey," Ynetnews.com, October 20, 2009; Rotella, "Before Deadly

Bulgaria Bombing, Tracks of a Resurgent Iran-Hezbollah Threat"; "Hezbollah

Denies Egypt Accusations," al-Jazira, April 11, 2009; Amos Harel, "Hezbollah

Planning Attack on Israelis in West Africa," Haaretz, August 4, 2008.

7 Ibid.

8 Edelson.

9 Ibid.

10 Personal interview, Israeli counterterrorism official, Tel Aviv, Israel,

September 13, 2012; Barak Ravid, "IDF Chief Reported: Hezbollah was Involved

in Attack on Israeli Convoy in Jordan," Haaretz, December 8, 2010.more on

the much larger concern of combating threats to its nascent nuclear

program.11 Malfunctioning components ruined Iranian centrifuges,12 Islamic

Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officers defected,13 and then a bomb killed

Iranian physics professor Masoud Ali Mohammadi outside his Tehran home in

January 2010.14

According to Israeli intelligence officials, Iranian leaders reached two

conclusions after Mohammadi's death: 1) Hizb Allah's IJO had to revitalize

its operational capabilities, not only to avenge Mughniyyeh's death, but

also to play a role in Iran's "shadow war" with the West; and 2) the IRGC

would no longer rely solely on Hizb Allah to carry out terrorist attacks

abroad.15 These officials claimed it would now deploy Qods Force operatives

to do so on their own, not just as logisticians supporting Hizb Allah hit

men.16 Even more than the loss of its scientists, Tehran sought to address

its damaged prestige-the image of an Iran so weak that it could not even

protect its own scientists at home.17 For its part, Israeli officials

contended that the Qods Force instructed Hizb Allah to prepare a campaign of

terrorist attacks targeting Israeli tourists worldwide.18

Under Nasrallah's instructions, Badreddine and Hamiyeh "undertook a massive

operational reevaluation in January 2010, which led to big changes within

the IJO over a period of a little over six months," in the words of one

Israeli official.19 During this period, IJO operations were put on hold and

major personnel changes made.20 New operatives were recruited

11 Personal interview, Israeli counterterrorism official, Tel Aviv, Israel,

September 13, 2012.

12 "Stuxnet: Targeting Iran's Nuclear Programme," International Institute

for Strategic Studies, February 2012.

13 Laura Rozen, "Where is Ali-Reza Asgari?" Politico, December 31, 2010.

14 Alan Cowell, "Blast Kills Physics Professor in Tehran," New York Times,

January 12, 2010.

15 Personal interviews, Israeli intelligence officials, Tel Aviv, Israel,

September 13, 2012.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.; Rotella, "Before Deadly Bulgaria Bombing, Tracks of a Resurgent

Iran-Hezbollah Threat."

19 Personal interviews, Israeli intelligence officials, Tel Aviv, Israel,

September 13, 2012.

20 Ibid.

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from the elite of Hizb Allah's military wing for intelligence and

operational training, while existing IJO operatives were moved into new

positions.21 At the same time, the IJO invested in the development of

capabilities and tradecraft that had withered since the 2001 decision to

rein in operations.22

Fits and Starts

Meanwhile, Hizb Allah operatives were busy planning operations to fulfill

their end of Iran's "shadow war" with the West: targeting Israeli tourists

abroad.23 Although it was still struggling to rebuild its foreign operations

capabilities, Hizb Allah continued to dispatch insufficiently prepared

operatives abroad in the hopes that one might succeed. Yet the increase in

plots did not yield results. According to a U.S. law enforcement official,

in one plot Hizb Allah paid criminal gang members $150,000 each to target a

Jewish school in Baku.24 Then, around the same time that authorities foiled

a January 2012 plot targeting Israeli vacationers in Bulgaria-just weeks

ahead of the anniversary of Mughniyyeh's assassination-authorities disrupted

another Hizb Allah plot in Greece.25 Yet it was halfway across the world, in

Bangkok, where Israeli and local authorities broke up a far more

ambitious-but no less desperate-Hizb Allah bid to target Israeli tourists.

On January 12, 2012, acting on a tip from Israeli intelligence, Thai police

arrested Hussein Atris-a Lebanese national who also carried a Swedish

passport-at Bangkok's Suvarnabhumi Airport as he attempted to flee the

country.26 Another suspect, whose police composite portrait strongly

resembled Naim Haris, a Hizb Allah recruiting agent whose photo Israeli

officials had publicized a year

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.; Rotella, "Before Deadly Bulgaria Bombing, Tracks of a Resurgent

Iran-Hezbollah Threat."

24 Judith Miller, "Bagels and Plots: Notes on the NYPD's High Holy Days

Threat Briefing," City Journal, September 7, 2012.

25 Personal interview, Israeli official, Tel Aviv, Israel, September 13,

2012.

26 Dudi Cohen, "Bangkok Threat: Terrorist's Swedish Connection,"

Ynetnews.com, January 15, 2012; "Second Terror Suspect Sought, Court Issues

Warrant for Atris's Housemate," Bangkok Post, January 20, 2012.earlier,

escaped.27 Within days, police issued an arrest warrant for Atris' roommate,

a Lebanese man who went by the name James Sammy Paolo.28

Questioned over the weekend of January 12, Atris led police to a three-story

building on the outskirts of Bangkok where he and his housemate had

stockpiled approximately 8,800 pounds of chemicals used to make

explosives.29 The materials were already distilled into crystal form, a step

in building bombs.30 Information on international shipping forms found at

the scene indicated that at least some of the explosives-which were stored

in bags marked as cat litter-were intended to be shipped abroad. Israeli

intelligence officials surmised that Hizb Allah had been using Thailand as

an explosives hub-Atris had rented the space a year earlier-and decided to

task its on-hand logistical operatives, who were apparently not trained in

the art of surveillance, to target Israeli tourists. The conclusion should

not have been a surprise: U.S. officials had already determined that Hizb

Allah was known to use Bangkok as a logistics and transportation hub,

describing the city as "a center for a [Hizb Allah] cocaine and

money-laundering network."31

Six months after its failed attempt to target Israeli skiers in Bulgaria,32

Hizb Allah bombed the Israeli tour bus in Burgas. While successful, some

elements of the Burgas plot highlighted operational shortcomings, such as

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 James Hookway, "Thai Police Seize Materials, Charge Terror-Plot Suspect,"

Wall Street Journal, January 17, 2012; Rotella, "Before Deadly Bulgaria

Bombing, Tracks of a Resurgent Iran-Hezbollah Threat."

30 Ibid.

31 Thomas Fuller, "In Twisting Terror Case, Thai Police Seize Chemicals,"

New York Times, January 16, 2012.

32 Yaakov Katz, "Bulgaria Foils Terror Attack Against Israelis," Jerusalem

Post, January 8, 2012.the fake Michigan driver's license used by the bomber

that featured a Baton Rouge, Louisiana, address.33 Other aspects of the

plot, however, demonstrated improved tradecraft. Hizb Allah dispatched two

operatives to see the bomber through his mission, both of whom traveled on

legitimate foreign passports (one Canadian, the other Australian).34 They

traveled to Bulgaria through Poland, then returned through Romania and

Turkey.35 Yet little more has been made public by Bulgarian authorities, and

despite their conclusion that Hizb Allah executed the attack, the

investigation remains open with investigators pursuing leads on at least

three continents.

The Cyprus Case Study: A Window into Hizb Allah Recruitment and Training

In contrast to the aforementioned plots, a treasure trove of information has

poured out of the trial in Cyprus of Hossam Yaacoub, the Lebanese-Swedish

dual citizen and self-confessed Hizb Allah operative arrested just days

before the Burgas bombing.36 All of the subsequent details on this case are

derived from Yaacoub's police interviews and depositions from the official

English translation, which are in the author's possession.

Arrested in his Limassol hotel room on the morning of July 7, 2012, just a

few hours after returning from a surveillance operation at Larnaca airport,

Yaacoub was first interviewed by Cypriot police over a five hour period

starting within an hour of his arrest. At first, Yaacoub provided only basic

background information about himself and insisted

33 See cover photo at Matthew Levitt, "Hizballah and the Qods Force in

Iran's Shadow War with the West," The Washington Institute for Near East

Policy, January 2013.

34 Matthew Brunwasser and Nicholas Kulish, "Multinational Search in Bulgaria

Blast," New York Times, February 6, 2013.

35 Ibid.

36 All references to Hossam Yaacoub's interviews and depositions came from

the official English translation of his police depositions. These were taken

in Arabic, translated into Greek, and then into English by a certified

translator. For details, see Depositions of Hossam Taleb Yaacoub (some

spelled Yaakoub), Criminal Number Σ/860/12, File Page 35, 79, 85, 110, 134,

187, by interviewing police officer Sergeant Michael Costas. Depositions

taken on July 7, 2012, July 11, 2012, July 11-12, 2012, July 14, 2012, July

16, 2012, and July 22, 2012.

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"The Bulgarian and Cypriot cases present compelling evidence of Hizb Allah's

return to traditional tradecraft."

he was nothing more than a Lebanese businessman looking to import Cypriot

goods into Lebanon. He had been to Cyprus three times, he explained, first

as a tourist about three years earlier, then for business in December 2011

and now again in July 2012. Yaacoub stuck to his cover story throughout his

first two police interviews on July 7 and July 11, 2012.

Several hours passed after the second interview, and as soon as Cypriot

police began their third interview of Yaacoub later that same night the

story began to change. "With regard to the previous deposition I gave to the

police," Yaacoub said. "I did not tell the whole truth." Four deposition

pages later, Yaacoub had changed his story, claiming to have been approached

in Lebanon by a man named Rami in June 2012. He described clandestine

meetings with Rami, always conducted during outdoor walks on which he was

not allowed to bring his cell phone. Rami tasked Yaacoub with checking on

the arrival of Israeli flights at Larnaca airport. Whatever favors he asked,

Yaacoub recalled Rami saying, would "be done for the sake of the religion

and the 'end.'" Yaacoub detailed Rami's instructions to set up e-mail

accounts through which he could contact Rami, to change his appearance and

avoid cameras at the airport, and to collect leaflets from specific Cypriot

hotels. Yaacoub said he took the $500 that Rami offered, traveled to Cyprus,

wore a hat and glasses and avoided security cameras when he went to the

airport to observe the arriving Israeli flights, and went to an internet

cafe to create the new e-mail accounts per Rami's instructions.

Yaacoub described Rami as a 38-year-old Lebanese man, muscular and 5'11"

tall, with a fair complexion, green eyes and blond hair. "I could recognize

him from a picture," Yaacoub noted, adding, "I don't know if Rami belongs to

Hizb Allah, he never mentioned such a word, but I suspected that he belongs

to this organization." Yaacoub concluded by saying "everything I said in my

deposition is the truth." It was not the truth, however. "Rami" never

existed. Only later would Yaacoub admit that "the story I told you in a

previous deposition about a guy called Rami, as you can guess, did not

happen."

The next interview took place a couple of days later and ran for two and a

half hours in the middle of the night. By the time the interview ended at

3:15 AM, police had a much fuller picture of Yaacoub's recruitment by Hizb

Allah and the nature of his mission in Cyprus and his previous operations

elsewhere in Europe. Again, Yaacoub opened the interview with a bombshell:

"I am an active member of Hizb Allah organization [sic] for approximately

four years now. I was recruited by a Lebanese called Reda in 2007."

For a full week after his arrest, Yaacoub kept Cypriot police at bay first

by sticking to his well-established cover story as a Lebanese merchant and

then by conceding that he was asked to collect information on Israeli

flights but making up a fake story about his recruitment. In fact, Hizb

Allah has a long history of teaching its operatives basic but effective

resistance-to-interrogation techniques. In March 2007, the same year Hizb

Allah recruited Yaacoub, a seasoned Hizb Allah operative was captured by

British forces in Iraq. In that case, Ali Musa Daqduq al-Musawi pretended to

be deaf and mute for several weeks before speaking and admitting to being a

senior Hizb Allah operative.37 From a counterintelligence perspective,

misleading one's interrogators for a period of time enables other operatives

to escape. The reason Yaacoub ultimately revealed the truth after a week of

deceptive statements likely parallels al-Musawi's experience in Iraq:

presented with hard evidence undermining his cover stories, and having

bought time for accomplices to cover their tracks, there was no longer a

need to mislead.

How Hizb Allah spotted Yaacoub is unknown, although their interest in his

European citizenship and import business was clear. Reda apparently called

Yaacoub on the telephone suddenly, inviting Yaacoub for a meeting in his

office at a Hizb Allah bureau responsible for "student issues." It was

37 "Press Briefing with Brig. Gen. Kevin Bergner, Spokesman, Multi-National

Force-Iraq," Multinational Force-Iraq, July 2, 2007; U.S. Military

Commission Charge Sheet for Ali Musa Daduq al Musawi, ISN #311933, January

3, 2012; Mark Urban, Task Force Black: The Explosive True Story of the

Secret Special Forces War in Iraq (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2010), pp.

224-225. there, not at a Hizb Allah military or terrorist facility, that

Yaacoub was told he was needed "for the secret mission of Hizb Allah."

Yaacoub was flattered: "I accepted because I considered that he needed me

for something great and I was for them the chosen one."

Reda immediately arranged for Yaacoub to meet his first Hizb Allah trainer,

Wahid, later that same day outside a Beirut storefront. Yaacoub worked with

Wahid for two to three months before going to Sweden to visit his father.

Yaacoub explained that "when I say 'work' I mean that Wahid explained to me

roughly the secret operation, in which I would participate. He always

pointed out that nobody should know anything, neither my family nor my

friends." Wahid trained Yaacoub for another couple of months after he

returned from Sweden, all of which was theoretical discussion focused on

"explaining to me that my secret mission would be surveillance and

undercover activities on behalf of Hizb Allah." Then Wahid handed Yaacoub

off to his next trainer.

A man named Yousef trained Yaacoub for another five to seven months,

focusing on operational security concepts. Yousef taught Yaacoub "how to

handle my personal life and my activities, so that people won't get

information about me and so that I can work undercover and persuasively

without giving rise to suspicions...he taught me how to create stories

undercover."

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"For all of his European travels on behalf of Hizb Allah, Yaacoub used his

Swedish passport, which he had renewed for this purpose. Once his basic

training was complete, Yaacoub became a salaried Hizb Allah operative,

earning $600 a month since 2010."

Later, Mahdi took over the training regimen which included Yaacoub's first

test-run. In 2008, Yaacoub was given a large, thin envelope to deliver to

someone in Antalya, Turkey, with specific instructions about the day, time

and place where the delivery was to be made. The meeting point was outside a

Turkish department store, and the recipient recognized Yaacoub based on the

specific hat and clothes Yaacoub wore, per his instructions. Once they

exchanged the pre-arranged code words, the handoff was made. Yaacoub stayed

in Turkey a couple of more days, at Hizb Allah's expense, before returning

to Lebanon. "I don't know what its contents was [sic] and I had not

entitlement to ask, because everything is done in complete secrecy within

the organization," he explained.

Having passed this test, Yaacoub was finally ready for military training and

was assigned yet another instructor named Abu Ali who he first met at a

secret meeting arranged by Mahdi. Abu Ali organized Yaacoub's military

training over the next few years, which involved six to seven different

training sessions each lasting for three to five days at a Hizb Allah

military camp. Yaacoub would get picked up at different spots in Beirut each

time, and was driven in closed vans so he and fellow trainees could not see

where they were going. Once there, Yaacoub added, it was clear from the

topography that they were in southern Lebanon.

Each military training group consisted of 10-13 trainees, all of whom wore

hoods-as did the instructors-to hide their identities from one another. They

each slept in their own tent and trained at another site. Yaacoub described

being trained in the use of multiple firearms, from handguns to

shoulder-fired missiles, including the FN Browning, Glock, AK-47, M-16,

MP-5, PK-5, and RPG-7. He also trained in the use of C4 explosives. Over the

same period of time while under the overall responsibility of Abu Ali,

Yaacoub attended training sessions in Beirut basements focused on teaching

surveillance techniques, how to work safely undercover, how to create a

cover story, and resistance-to-interrogation techniques such as how to

defeat a polygraph test.

In 2009, Yaacoub explained, Abu Ali sent him on a mission to Cyprus "to

create a cover story for people to get to know me, to keep coming with a

justifiable purpose and without giving rise to suspicions." He traveled to

Cyprus via Dubai to strengthen his cover, and spent a week vacationing in

Ayia Napa at Hizb Allah's expense. When he returned to Cyprus two years

later, he would be able to say that the idea for importing merchandise from

Cyprus came to him while on vacation there in 2009.

Each time he returned from a mission, including this one, Yaacoub was

debriefed by a Hizb Allah security official who wanted to know where Yaacoub

went, who he met, what the climate was like, how people live in the given

location, and the state of the economy. On his return from his 2009 Cyprus

vacation, Yaacoub was assigned to a new instructor, Aiman, who sent him on

his next mission to Lyon, France, at Hizb Allah's expense. His assignment:

to receive a bag from one person and deliver it to someone else, all using

the same tradecraft (identification signs and codewords) he employed on his

last courier mission in Turkey. Shortly thereafter, Aiman sent Yaacoub to

Amsterdam, where he retrieved a cell phone, two SIM cards, and an unknown

object wrapped in newspapers, and he brought them back to Aiman in Lebanon.

Then, in December 2011 and again in January 2012, Aiman sent Yaacoub back to

Cyprus "to create a cover story" as a merchant interested in importing to

Lebanon juices from a specific local company in Cyprus. He was also tasked

with collecting information about renting a warehouse in Cyprus. "I did all

these things after receiving clear instructions from Hizb Allah, so to have

Cyprus as a basis [sic] and be able to serve the organization," he said.

Yaacoub maintained he did not know why Hizb Allah wanted this base of

operations, but speculated "perhaps they would commit a criminal act or

store firearms and explosives."

For all of his European travels on behalf of Hizb Allah, Yaacoub used his

Swedish passport, which he had renewed for this purpose. Once his basic

training was complete, Yaacoub became a salaried Hizb Allah operative,

earning $600 a month since 2010.

Yaacoub's next interview with Cypriot police occurred on July 16, 2012, in

the late evening. His first words were: "My operational name, that is my

nickname within Hizb Allah, is Wael." Yaacoub offered more details about

Hizb Allah's operational security protocols, such as the need to answer a

coded question each time he was picked up in Beirut for military training

out of town. Aiman provided the updated passwords each time, and then

different passwords would be provided by each instructor.

Yaacoub now admitted that his December 2011 visit to Cyprus actually

involved several separate missions. First, Aiman tasked Yaacoub with

gathering details on a parking lot behind the Limassol Old Hospital and near

the police and traffic departments. Aiman wanted Yaacoub to take pictures

and be able to draw a schematic of the area on his return. Yaacoub was to

specifically look for security cameras, if payment was required on entry, if

car keys were left with a parking attendant, if there was a security guard,

among other observations. Yaacoub was also told to find internet cafes in

Limassol and Nicosia, which he marked on a map for Aiman, and to purchase

three SIM cards for mobile phones from different vendors on different days,

which he did. He also found good meeting places, such as at a zoo in

Limassol and outside a castle in Larnaca. In the event a meeting was

necessary, Yaacoub would receive a text message. A text about the weather

meant to go to the Finikoudes promenade in Larnaca that day at 6 PM. If no

one showed up, Yaacoub was to return the following day at 2:00 PM, and then

again the next day at 10:30 AM. Aiman also wanted Yaacoub "to spot Israeli

restaurants in Limassol, where Jews eat 'kosher,'" but an internet search

indicated there were none. Later, in January 2012, Yaacoub was instructed to

check out the Golden Arches hotel in Limassol, collect brochures and

reconnoiter the area (he did survey the area, but the hotel was being

renovated).

"Hizb Allah knows Cyprus very well," Yaacoub told police, adding he thought

his taskings were intended to update the group's files "and create a

database."

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He insisted that he was not part of any plot "to hit any target in Cyprus

with firearms or explosives," adding that he would have had the right to

refuse the mission if asked to execute such an act.

Five days passed before Yaacoub's final police interview, which took place

midday on July 22, 2012. Yaacoub conceded he was "aware of the ideology and

the objectives of [the] Hizb Allah organization," adding this was limited to

protecting Lebanese territory "with all legal means," which he noted

included "armed struggle, military operations, and the political way." He

opposed terrorism, he stressed, saying it was different from war. Yaacoub

expressed support for "the armed struggle for the liberation of Lebanon from

Israel," but was "not in favor of the terrorist attacks against innocent

people."

Then, he added: "I don't believe that the missions I executed in Cyprus were

connected with the preparation of a terrorist attack in Cyprus. It was just

collecting information about the Jews, and this is what my organization is

doing everywhere in the world."

On March 21, 2013, a Cypriot criminal court convicted Yaacoub of helping to

plan attacks against Israeli tourists on the island last July. In their

80-page decision, the judges rejected Yaacoub's defense that he collected

information for Hizb Allah but did not know for what it would be used. There

could be no "innocent explanation" of Yaacoub's actions, the court

determined, adding that he "should have logically known" his surveillance

was linked to a criminal act.38

Reason for Concern

Taken together, the Bulgarian and Cypriot cases present compelling evidence

of Hizb Allah's return to traditional tradecraft. As the Yaacoub case makes

clear, several years before the Qods Force instructed Hizb Allah to

rejuvenate its IJO terrorist wing in January 2010, the group had already

been recruiting operatives with foreign passports, and providing new

recruits with military training and surveillance skills. Yaacoub was

recruited in 2007, while Mughniyyeh was still

38 Menelaos Hadjicostis, "Cyprus Court Convicts Hezbollah Member,"

Associated Press, March 21, 2013.alive. Indeed, while Mughniyyeh's

assassination prompted the group to resume international operations in a way

they had not since before 9/11, Hizb Allah never stopped identifying and

recruiting new operatives for a variety of different types of missions at

home and around the world.

There is no question, however, that the operational failures that followed

Mughniyyeh's assassination demonstrated that the group's foreign operational

capabilities had weakened over time. When Mughniyyeh was killed, and later

when Iran wanted Hizb Allah to play a role in its "shadow war" with the

West, Hizb Allah was not yet fully prepared to do so. Yet the Bulgaria and

Cyprus cases suggest that this may no longer be the case. Yaacoub was no

anomaly, as the Burgas attacks made clear. Like Yaacoub and the Burgas

operatives, some of those new recruits are Western citizens. During one of

his training sessions, Yaacoub heard another trainee speaking fluent Arabic

with some English words mixed in. According to Yaacoub, the trainee spoke

with a distinctly American accent.39

Dr. Matthew Levitt is a senior fellow at The Washington Institute for Near

East Policy where he directs the Institute's Stein Program on

Counterterrorism and Intelligence. Previously, Dr. Levitt served in the

senior executive service as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence

and Analysis at the U.S. Department of the Treasury and before that as an

FBI counterterrorism analyst, including work on the Millennial and September

11th plots. He also served as a State Department counterterrorism adviser to

General James L. Jones, the special envoy for Middle East regional security

(SEMERS). Dr. Levitt is the author of the forthcoming book Hezbollah: The

Global Footprint of Lebanon's Party of God (Georgetown University Press,

2013).

39 Depositions of Hossam Taleb Yaacoub (some spelled Yaakoub), Criminal

Number Σ/860/12, File Page 187, by interviewing police officer Sergeant

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